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ADMISSIBILITY OF MORTALITY TABLES IN PENNSYLVANIA-
Pennsylvania has always been very cautious about admitting mortality
tables in evidence. An even greater strictness, exceeding that hereto-
fore exercised by any jurisdiction, is foreshadowed by strong dicta of
the Supreme Court of the State in the case of McCaffrey v.
Schwartz.' It is there declared that their admission in certain situa-
tions is to be left to the discretion of the trial court.
The use of standard mortality tables 2 in judicial proceedings as a
guide in determining life expectancy is well established. Practically
everywhere they have been admitted in evidence.3 Courts have taken
judicial notice of them,4 and in some states such tables have been in-
cluded in the codes. They have been held not to exclude the evidence
of competent witnesses on life expectancy,5 nor has their introduction
been held a prerequisite to a recovery of damages,6 for they are in no
case conclusive.' Their value and the weight to be given them has by
most courts been held to depend on the circumstances of each case,
such as the injured party's physical condition, his habits, the perils of
his employment, the extent and permanence of his injuries, and such
other matters as may be relevant.8 In cases the particular circum-
stances of which made the tables by themselves an inaccurate guide, it
1285 Pa. 56r, 132 Atl. 8Io (1926).
'Many courts of the country consider the American tables as perhaps the
best means of arriving at the expectancy of life: Gordon v. Tweedy, 74 Ala. 232
(1883) ; Ill., etc., Ry. v. Houchins, 121 Ky. 526, 89 S. W. 530 (1905). Others
recognized as standard are: the Carlisle tables, McDonald v. Chicago, etc., R. R.,
26 Iowa I24 (1868); the Northampton tables, Sauter v. N. Y. Cent. R. R.,
66 N. Y. 50 (1876) ; and the Wigglesworth tables, Calvert v. Springfield etc.,
Co., 231 Ill. 290, 83 N. E. 184 (i9o7).
'Presley v. Kinlock, etc., Co., I58 Ill. App. 220 (IgIO) ; Winn v. Cleveland,
etc., R. R., 239 Ill. 132, 87 N. E. 954 (i9o9); Little v. Bousfield, I65 Mich.
654, 131 N. W. 63 (911). See also the compilation of cases in WIGmORE, Evi-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 1698, n. I.
'Southern Pacific R. R. v. De Valla Da Costa, igo Fed. 689 (C. C. A. ist,
r9I); Timson v. M'f'rs., etc., Co., 220 Mo. 580, 119 S. W. 565 (IW9O). In
Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Tel. Co., 23 N. Dak. 6, 135 N. W. 793 (i912) the court
said it "will take judicial notice of the standard tables, and if called on or even
if not called on may instruct the jury in relation thereto."
" Rowley v. London Ry., L. B. 8 Exch. 221 (1873).
'Nelson v. Branford, etc., Co., 75 Conn. 548, 54 At. 303 (I9O3) ; Ruehl v.
Lidgerwood Tel. Co., mpra note 4; Davis v. Standish, 26 Hun 6o8 (N. Y.
1882).
' Kountz v. Toledo, etc., R. R. 189 Fed. 494 (N. D. Ohio i9o8) ; Little
v. Bousfield, mspra note 3; Haines v. Pearson, ioO Mo. App. 551, 75 S. W. 194
(903).
'Vicksburg, etc., R. R. v. Putnam, xi8 U. S. 545 (1886) ; Birmingham, etc.,
R. R. v. Wilmer, 97 Ala. I65 (1892) ; Coates v. Burlington, etc., R. R., 62 Iowa
486 (1883).
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has been held no error to admit them under careful instructions.
Thus far, mortality tables have been excluded only on principles of
substantive law.10
Pennsylvania has followed these principles, but the dicta of many
of its cases have been unfavorable to the use of tables and are a strong
foundation for the recent utterance that their admission lies within
the discretion of the trial judge. In Steinbrunner v. Pittsburgh Ry.,11
Pennsylvania admitted mortality tables for the first time, in the trial of
a negligence case. Subsequent cases held that the tables were admis-
sible as an aid in determining the life expectancy in view of all the con-
ditions surrounding the particular life in question; 12 and that, while
they were admissible, the probability of life could be shown in other
ways, and it was not error to fail to produce the tables in evidence.
13
On their first admission Chief Justice Paxson said: "While we are
unable to see how such evidence is to be excluded, it (the court) must
be allowed to express a fear that it may prove a dangerous element in
this class of cases, unless the attention of juries is pointedly called to
the other questions which affect it." Later, in Kerrigan v. Pennsylva-
nia R. R., 14 the court said:
"Experience has demonstrated, however, that what was
merely apprehended by Paxson, C. J., has since been realized.
Courts and juries, as a rule, give far more weight to this testi-
mony that it is entitled to; they are apt to supply the place of
proof of expectancy of the particular life by generalization from
life tables. This is going further than was intended or than is
warranted. Therefore, a halt is called on the manifest tendency
to 'give them' undue weight."
In McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 5 admissibility was not the question
before the court, but the opportunity was taken to declare that the
'Greer v. Louisville, etc., R. R., 94 Ky. 169, 21 S. W. 649 (1893) ; Broz v.
Omaha Maternity Ass'n, 96 Neb. 648, 148 N. W. 575 (91).
" Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bratt, 55 Md. 200 (188o); Shippen's and Rob-
bins' Appeal, 8o Pa. 391 (1876).
146 Pa. 504, 23 Atl. 239 (1892). Earlier, in Shippen's and Robbins' Ap-
peal, supra note io, tables were excluded on the ground that the measure of a
life estate is fixed by a common law rule. Contra: Cusick v. Bayne, i Cal. App.
643, 82 Pac. 985 (1905).
' Pauza v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 231 Pa. 577, 8o Atl. 1126 "(1911). And
see Brenisholtz v, P. R. R., 229 Pa. 88, 78 Atl. 37 (igio), where it was said
that the Carlisle tables are evidence, not to prove the precise term of plaintiff's
life, but to be considered in connection with other testimony for the purpose of
determining her probable expectancy of life.
'Benson v. Altoona, etc., Ry., 228 Pa. 290, 77 At. 492 (191o); Amos v.
Del. River Ferry Co., 228 Pa. 362, 77 Atl. 12 (191o).
14 194 Pa. 98, 44 Atl. 1o69 (1899) ; see also Seifred v. P. R. R., 206 Pa. 399,
55 Atl. io6i (1903).
Supra note i.
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admissibility of mortality tables is subject to two well-recognized prin-
ciples:
"(i) Where there is already sufficient evidence before the
jury from which, without the aid of tables, it can properly decide
the probable duration of the life in question, the trial judge may
exercise his sound discretion as in the case of any matter of
cumulative evidence and decline to admit the tables, on the ground
of lack of necessity; (2) Where, under the facts of a particular
case, the admission of the tables would tend to do more harm
than good (if, for instance, the plaintiff did not enjoy normally
good health before the accident, or is following a particularly
hazardous occupation, or there is no reasonable probability of
the financially harmful effects of the injury lasting till the end
of plaintiff's life), the trial judge, in the exercise of a sound dis-
cretion, may bar them, just as he may refuse any other evidence
which will tend to confuse or mislead the jury."
It is believed that no court has gone to the extent that Pennsyl-
vania has gone in the principal case in its treatment of mortality
tables. While other courts have safeguarded parties from their abuse,
and have cautioned the trial judge to be careful in his instructions to
the jury concerning them, none of them has placed it within the trial
judge's discretion to refuse to admit the tables because of other evi-
dence, or because they might confuse or mislead the jury.
Whether the limitations announced by the Pennsylvania court
will bring about better results is questionable. The court says:
"Where there is already sufficient evidence . . . the trial judge
may decline to admit the tables." What this other sufficient evidence
is, is not stated. But whatever it may be, at its best it can -be only
speculation dealing as it does with so uncertain a problem as the de-
termination of the duration of life of an individual. Admitted that
as to an individual the mortality tables also are speculative, yet, as be-
tween the two speculations, the mortality tables, consisting of sum-
marized statistical information gathered from thousands of lives are
so nearly in the nature of exact science or mathematical demonstra-
tion that, in the long run, they are bound to do more substantial
justice than haphazard determinations. 16 An individual's forecast of
life expectancy is pure guesswork, no matter on what facts it is based.
And while, in certain cases, he is apt to forecast as well as one basing
his opinion upon mortality tables, yet because he is merely guessing,
his average error will be greater than that of forecasts based upon
scientific principles.
The second principle laid down by the court, that, where "the
"See Camden R. R. v. Williams, 6i N. J. L. 646 (1898), where the court
said: "They (mortality tables) are derived from statistics preserved through a
course of years and have become standard by the test of subsequent experience."
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admission of tables would tend to do more harm than good
the trial judge may bar them," has greater merit. But even here the
court seems to be sacrificing the value that lies in the proper use of
the tables to avoid the evils of their abuse. Even though the mortality
tables in general use throughout the United States today, the Ameri-
can tables, are based on the insurable lives of healthy persons, it seems
better to determine first from scientific data what will be the probable
life expectancy of a healthy person, and then alter it for the illness
from which the person suffers, the hazardous occupation he is engaged
in, or whatever it is that affects his rating as a healthy being.
17
The court in the principal case would give to mortality tables a
secondary evidential position, permitting their use when other sources
of evidence have been found wanting. It is submitted they should
occupy the primary position in determining so uncertain a question as
the probable expectancy of life, and all other varying factors, such as
sex, prior state of health, nature of daily employment and its perils,
manner of living, personal habits, individual characteristics and other
facts concerning the injured party should only be used in scaling down
the probable life expectancy of the individual concerned in the par-
ticular case, from the life expectancy, for a person his age, given in
the mortality tables. The danger of mortality tables lies not in their
content but rather in their interpretation by an uninstructed jury. In
the principal case 18 the court said: "When tables of this character are
part of the evidencq in a case, the court shall carefully instruct con-
cerning their use, and all the factors which tend to limit their applica-
tion ought to be stressed." Mortality tables, then, should be admitted
in all cases where the probable expectancy of life of an individual is
in question. 19 But once they are admitted, very careful instructions
concerning their use, and the factors which alter their application to
the case at bar, should be given by the trial judge to the jury and lack
of such careful instructions, or indications that the jury ignored them
in their verdict, should be grounds for reversible error.
F.J.G.
17 In Arkansas, etc., R. R. v. Griffith, 63 Ark. 491, 39 S. W. 550 (1897), the
court said: "When by reason of enfeebled physical condition, the standard tables
are not strictly applicable, on that account, yet they are more or less efficient
aids in arriving at an approximation of the truth, and that is the best that can
be hoped for, after all."
"Supra note i.
" In Temson v. M'f'rs., etc., Co., supra note 5, the court said: "Common ex-
perience teaches that there is nothing forecasting the future more certain than
the average expectation of human life as computed by the tables in common use
among life insurance companies." And in Rowley v. R. R., supra note 4, Black-
burn, J., said: "We think the probable and average duration of a life of that age
was material, and we do not see how that could be better shown than by proving
the practice of life insurance companies, who learn it by experience."
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INFRINGEMENT OF MUSICAL COPYRIGHT BY RADIO BROAD-
CASTING--Like all other new inventions, radio communication brings
with it its share of our ever-increasing store of legal problems.1 In
the few years of its existence the radio has given rise to many per-
plexing and interesting questions of law, not the least important of
which involves an interpretation of what is commonly referred to as
the Copyright Act of 19o9.2 For several years a bitter battle has been
waged-which still continues-between the copyright owners and the
broadcasters.3 To date it has resulted in three actions before the fed-
eral courts.4 Only one other case has ever come up on the same gen-
eral subject, an Australian case decided by the Supreme Court of Vic-
toria.5 In all of these cases (actions by the copyright owners against
the broadcasters for infringement of copyright) the courts have been
asked to decide if a particular set of facts amounted to a "public per-
formance for profit"--the necessary elements of an infringement un-
der the Copyright Act.6
What constitutes "for profit" seems now to be quite definitely set-
tled both in this country' and in England.8 For a time there was
some confusion on the subject, but all doubts were completely put at
rest by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the oft-
cited case of Herbert v. Shanley.9 That was a suit for infringement
by the composer, Victor Herbert, against the owner of a public restau-
rant wherein the defendant's orchestra, without the plaintiff's permis-
sion, was playing a musical composition, the copyright of which was
1For a discussion of some of the legal problems incident to the development
of radio communication see I U. OF CIxN. L. REv. I (1927) and KAN. B. A. R.
125 (1925).
'Act of March 4, 1909, 35 STAT. 1075, U. S. Comp. STAT. (igx8) § 9517.
' The great majority of copyright owners are members of the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and most of the broadcasters are
members of the National Association of Broadcasters. As a practical matter,
it is these organizations and not their individual members who are carrying on
the hostilities. The views and arguments of each are fully set forth in the
printed pamphlet, "Joint Hearings Before the Committees on Patents of the
69th Cong., ist Sess., on Bills S. 2328 and H. 10353, held April 5-10, 1926."
'M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D. C. N. J. 1923);
J. H. Remick & Co. v. Amer. Auto Access. Co., 5 F. (2d) 4H (C. C. A. 6th,
1925); J. H. Remick & Co. v. Genel Elec Co., i6 F. (2d) 829 (S. D. N. Y.
1926).
5 Chappell & Co., Ltd., v. Associated Radio Co. of Australia, Ltd., [1925] V.
L. P- 350. See infra note 13.
"Sec. x (e) provides: "Any person entitled thereto, upon compliance with
the provisions of this Act, shall have the exclusive right: . . . (e) To per-
form the copyrighted work publicly for profit if it be a musical composition,
etc."
.Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U. S. 59i (1917), with which was decided the
similar case of John Church Co. v. Hilliard Hotel Co.
8Sarpy v. Holland, 99 L. T. P- 317 (i9o8).
'Supra note 7, reversing 221 Fed. 229 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) and 229 Fed. 340
(C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
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owned by the plaintiff. In answer to the defendant's argument that
the admitted public performance was not for profit since no charge
for the music was made to those patronizing the restaurant, the court,
through Mr. Justice Holmes, said :10
"The defendant's performances are not eleemosynary. They
are part of a total for which the public pays, and the fact that the
price of the whole is attributed to a particular item which those
present are expected to order, is not important. . . . If music
did not pay it would be given up. If it pays, it pays out of the
public's pocket. Whether it pays or not the purpose of employ-
ing it is profit and that is enough." 11
Of the broadcasting cases Witmark v. Bamberger & Co. is the
only one which dealt at any length with this question of whether or
not the performance was for profit. In that case, the defendant was
a department store which maintained a broadcasting station, the cost
of which was charged against the general expenses of the business.
Before and after each number on its program the defendant an-
nounced the store slogan, "L. Bamberger & Co., One of America's
Great Stores, Newark, N. J." Also, there was the additional fact that
the store sold radio receiving sets and accessories. In the light of all
those circumstances there can be no doubt that the District Court was
correct in holding that the case fell clearly under the doctrine of the
Shanley case and that the broadcasting was, therefore, for profit. That
this profit was indirect was of no consequence. As this decision has
never been appealed, doubted, or unfavorably criticized, 12 it may be
accepted as the law of today.
A somewhat more difficult problem is presented in determining
what is a "public performance" which, under the Copyright Act,
amounts to an infringement. In this connection, it is to be regretted
that our Act does not define "performance" as does the English Copy-
right Act."3 That Congress did not contemplate radio broadcasting
when it passed the Act of 1909 is undisputed. Yet that alone is not
sufficient to prevent the Act, liberally construed,"4 from applying to
" Supra note 7, at 594, 595.
' Accord: Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa. 1922); Witmark v.
Pastime Amuse. Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924), aff'd, 2 F. (2d) lO2O
(C. C. A. 4th, 1924); Witmark v. Bamberger & Co., mupra note 4.
'Favorably commented on in 72 U. oF PA. L. REv. 19o (1924) and 24 COL.
L. Ray. 90 (1924).
"The English Copyright Act (1911), I & 2 Geo. V. c. 46 §35 (I), defines
"performance" to mean "any acoustic representation of a work . . . including
such a representation made by means of any mechanical instrument." It was
this provision, which is also the law in Australia, that caused the Australian
court to decide the Chappell case, supra note 5, against the broadcaster. For that
reason, the Chappell case is not direct authority for the American courts.
", See 13 C. J. ioo8 and cases there cited for the proposition that Copyright
Statutes should be liberally construed.
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this modern development. 15 As stated in Chappell v. Associated Radio
Co. of Australia,
"it was not disputed that if things not known at the time of the
coming into operation of an Act fall on a fair construction within
its words, they should be held to be included. The things such
as motor cars, now held to be included in the word 'vehicle,' af-
ford a good illustration. And so here the general expressions
. . . 'performance' and 'acoustic representation,' are sufficiently
wide in their natural meaning to apply to the present case."17
If we adopt the view that copyright statutes are in derogation of
the common law and therefore to be strictly construed'18 we arrive
at the conclusion reached by the District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Ohio on the original hearing of the case of Remick v. Ameri-
can Auto. Accessories Co., 9 this being the first court to pass on the
question in its relation to radio broadcasting.20 As usual, the dispute
there was between a complaining copyright owner and a broadcasting
concern which was also engaged in selling radio equipment. After
quoting the definition of a "performance" from only one dictionary 2L
the court, said: 22
"In order to constitute a public performance in the sense in
which we think Congress intended the words, it is absolutely es-
sential that there be an assemblage of persons-an audience con-
gregated for the purpose of hearing that which transpires at the
place of amusement."
Remick v. Amer. Auto. Access. Co., supra note 4.
1 8Supra note 5, at 361.
"Accord: Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U. S. 55 (1911) (motion pictures
held to be a "dramatization" of a copyrighted novel and so an infringement) ;
Gambart v. Ball, 14 C. B. (N. S.) 3o6 (1863) (a photograph held to be a
"copy") ; Remick v. Amer. Auto. Access. Co., supra note 4.
'White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Appollo Co., 209 U. S. 1 (i9o8) (refus-
ing to hold a music roll a "copy")-this case, it will be noticed, was decided be-
fore the present Act was passed, and is specifically covered in the present Act
§ I (e); Bobbs-Merrill v. Strauss, 210 U. S. 339 (i9o8).
i9298 Fed. 628 (S. D. Ohio 1924).
'In the Bamberger case the court confined itself exclusively to the question
of "profit," though its decision necessarily holds broadcasting to be a "public
performance." Strangely enough, in Remick v. Amer. Auto. Access. Co. the
court passed over the question of "profit" and Oevoted its entire attention to the
"public performance" element. See DEWoLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW
(1925) i08, 109.
'Funk & Wagnalls' Standard Dictionary (1911): "(2) Specifically a rep-
resentation on the stage or before an audience or spectators; . . . any enter-
tainment at a place of amusement; as two performances daily."
' Hickenlooper, D. J., at 631.
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Accordingly, in a decision criticised as over-technical 23 and unf or-
tunately influenced by the dictionary-definition method of constru-
ing words,24 the court held that the broadcaster had not publicly per-
formed the copyrighted musical composition and so was not guilty
of an infringement. However, the broadcaster's joy was short-lived
for a year later, on appeal of the case by the disappointed composer,
the Circuit Court of the Sixth Circuit reversed the decision of the
lower court.2 5 Adopting a more liberal construction of the Act, the
upper court held the broadcasting of the song to be an infringement.
Circuit Judge Mack, who rendered the opinion, used language which,
it will be noticed, is diametrically opposed to the words quoted above
from District Judge Hickenlooper's opinion when he said: 28
"A performance, in our judgment, is no less public because
the listeners are unable to communicate with one another, or are
not assembled within an enclosure, or gathered together in some
open stadium or park or other public place. Nor can a per-
formance be deemed private because each listener may enjoy it
alone in the privacy of his home. Radio broadcasting is intended
to, and in fact does, reach a very much larger part of the public at
the moment of rendition than any other medium of performance.
The artist is consciously addressing a great, though unseen and
widely scattered, audience and is therefore participating in a pub-
lic performance."
This decision, which was favorably received by legal critics, 27
conclusively settled the law on this subject (when the performing
artists are under the broadcaster's control), which now conforms to
the common sense, practical conception of a public performance.28
The United States Supreme Court has never passed on any of these
broadcasting cases though its refusal to grant a writ of certiorari in
the case just discussed, 29 while not a definite indication of its view on
the merits, is a fact of some significance. In the opinion of the writer,
even if the writ had been granted, the ruling of the Circuit Court
would have been upheld because the broadcasting of a song rendered
in the broadcaster's own studio by his own orchestra seems clearly t6
fall within the purview of the Statute.
This brings us to the problem, previously intimated, which-is at
once the most interesting and delicate of all. Is the unauthorized
broadcasting of a copyrighted musical composition rendered elsewhere
=28 LAw NOTES 25, 27 (1924).
434 YALE L. J. io, no (1924).
' Remick v. Amer. Auto. Access. Co., supra note 4.
'Ibid., 412, quoted with approval in Remick v. Gen'l Elec. Co., supra note 4.
239 HARv. L. REV. 269 (925); 4 TENN-. L. REV. 215 (1926); 4o A. L. R.
1511, 1515 (926).
2 Chappell v. Associated Radio Co., etc., supra note 5, at 360.
'269 U. S. 556 (1925).
NOTES
than in the broadcaster's studio by performers over whom the broad-
caster has no control a "public performance for profit"? Remick v.
General Electric Co., a very recent case presenting this problem, has
come before the federal courts on two occasions, once on a prelimi-
nary motion for an injunction pendente lite and a cross-petition for
dismissal of the bill,30 and later on the merits.31 Briefly, the facts
were these: the defendant operated a broadcasting station at Schenec-
tady for the purpose of stimulating the sale of radio products made
by it; by means of a microphone, in charge of one of the defendant's
employees and placed in the ballroom of an Albany hotel, the defend-
ant "picked up" the unauthorized rendition of plaintiff's copyrighted
song, the defendant having no control over the hotel's orchestra which
actually played the piece; the sounds thus "picked up" were electrically
communicated to the defendant's station where they were trans-
formed into electro-magnetic waves which, in turn, were transmitted
through the ether. In denying both preliminary motions 2 the court,
obiter, made the matter of infringement depend upon whose per-
formance was being broadcast, intimating that if it was the perform-
ance of an authorized person then "such broadcasting merely gives
the authorized performer a larger audience, and is not to be regarded
as a separate and distinct performance of the copyrighted composition
upon the part of the broadcaster." 3 3 But, "if a broadcaster procures
an unauthorized performance of a copyrighted musical composition
to be given, and for his own profit makes the same available to the
public . . . he is to be regarded as an infringer. It may also be
that he becomes a contributory infringer in the event he broadcasts
the unauthorized performance by another. . . . To this proposi-
tion, however, I do not now finally commit myself." 3 4 Unfortunately,
these dicta, instead of settling any of our problems, merely add to
them.3 5 Just how these suggested questions will be answered if they
should ever arise is a matter of conjecture. It is submitted that in
their desire to protect the composers and publishers, whose industry
and genius create the music, the courts will probably decide against
the broadcaster. As a contemporary text-writer has said: 88
"On principle a performance transmitted to the public in this
way (by radio broadcasting) would seem to be a public per-
formance but . . . the question cannot be regarded as entirely
free from doubt until it has been passed upon by the United
States Supreme Court or settled by new legislation."
"Remick v. Gen'l Elec. Co., 4 F. (2d) i6o (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
Remick v. Gen'l Elec. Co., supra note 4.
"Supra note 3o.
Knox, D. J., at i6o.
"Ibid.
DE WoLF, op. cit. supra note 20, at III.
"Ibid., 158, 159.
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When Remick v. General Electric Co. was tried on its merits the
defendant advanced, among others, the ingenious argument that the
broadcaster had not "performed" but had merely opened the doors
and windows of the ballroom, thereby providing facilities for a larger
audience to hear another's performance. 3 7 The court, however, thought
differently and replied:
"It is not enough to say that the broadcaster merely opens
the windows, and the orchestra does the rest. On the contrary,
the acts of the broadcaster are found in the reactions of his in-
struments, constantly animated and controlled by himself, and
those acts are quite as continuous and indefinitely more complex
than the playing of the selection by the orchestra. . . . In so
doing it seems clear that he participates in the infringement."
This reasoning is unimpeachable, because there can be no dis-
tinction between causing the ether to vibrate by means of a violin
played by hand or a machine controlled by electricity. When one opens
a window through which the vibrations enter, he does not create the
physical, external stimulus that produces the sound; he merely re-
moves an obstacle which prevents that stimulus from reaching its
destination. The test, therefore, to determine whether one has "per-
formed" seems to be-has he created the physical stimulus? Applying
this test to the principal case, the broadcaster most assuredly has per-
formed.
Another argument raised by the defendant which was of more
than passing interest was-would the performance still be an infringe-
ment if nobody had "tuned in" and heard the broadcasted music? No
court has ever answered this, the court in Remick v. General Electric
Co. refusing to comment upon it since it was not there involved-that
defendant's music having been heard by members of the public. How-
ever, since the Act grants to the copyright owner the "exclusive right
to perform 38 the copyrighted work publicly for profit ",s and
since it nowhere indicates that the performance must be heard, it is
submitted that by the mere act of broadcasting the copyrighted song
the broadcaster is guilty of an infringement. 40
From this survey of the subject it appears that one may not, for
a direct or indirect profit, broadcast the copyrighted musical composi-
tion of another without that other's permission. If we agree with the
"Cf. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 Fed. 592 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) (lessor of
a concert hall held not to be a co-infringer because he leased his hall to an artist
who there gave an unauthorized public performance for profit of a copyrighted
musical composition).
3s Italics mine.
Supra note 6.
,0 The writer does not wish to revive the metaphysical argument that there
is no sound unless somebody hears it, because, it is submitted, the act of creating
the stimulus and not the effect of that act is the performance.
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contention that radio broadcasting is affected with a public interest,
and that the broadcasting business should be put in a position to fur-
nish its patrons with the latest music,41 then, it is submitted, the mat-
ter is for Congress and not for the courts.
42
S.B.G.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GOVERNMENTAL AND MUNICIPAL
FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AS APPLIED IN THE LAW
OF TORTS-In recent years, the activities of municipal corporations
have assumed an unparalleled scope. The exercise of broad powers
and functions, in the natural course of things, has often resulted in
injury to persons or property, occasioned by the torts of servants of
the city, and so the question of liability of municipal corporations for
tort has frequently come before the courts. At the basis of this lia-
bility lies the distinction between governmental and municipal func-
tions. As a general rule, if the injury occurred in the exercise of a
governmental function the plaintiff is denied a recovery, whereas if the
function then being exercised was municipal, the city corporation is
answerable for its wrong as is any other individual.' An inquiry into
the distinction is therefore indispensable.
The dual functional capacity of municipal corporations is uni-
versally admitted by the courts.2  A city's multifarious activities are
divided, for our purposes, into two groups, variously termed on the
one hand, governmental, public, legislative, or discretionary, and on the
other proprietary, ministerial, private, corporate, or municipal.3 The
line of demarcation between these groups is clearly defined. "In its
governmental character, the corporation is made by the state one of
of its instruments, or the local depository of certain limited and pre-
scribed political powers, to be exercised for the public good in behalf
of the state rather than for itself. . . . But in its proprietary or
private character, the theory is that the powers are supposed not to
be conferred, primarily or chiefly, from considerations connected
with the government of the state at large, but for the private ad-
'13o LAw NOTES 22 (1926). See also the arguments of the broadcasters in
"Joint Hearings, etc.", supra note 3.
"Bills S. 2328 and H. R. 10353 to amend the Copyright Act of 19o9, intro-
duced in the U. S. Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, in the early
part of 1926, make the same provision for radio broadcasting as Sec. I (e) of the
Act of i9o9 makes for music rolls, phonograph records, etc. To date, these bills
are still in the hands of the Joint Committee on Patents.
14 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th Ed. 1911) §1625 et seq.; 6
McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1913) §2604 et seq.
South Carolina has rejected the distinction in tort cases because of its dif-
ficulty of application. Irvine v. Greenwood, 89 S. C. 511, 72 S. E. 228 (1911).
'The terms governmental and municipal have been adopted for the purposes
of this note as being logically and historically the most accurate.
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vantage of the compact community which is incorporated as a dis-
tinct legal personality or corporate individual." 
Although the distinction is well established, its origin is exceed-
ingly difficult to trace. It has been said 5 that this legal concept first
arose in the case of Russell v. Men of Devon,' but there seems to be
a suggestion of it in an earlier case.7 Judge Dillon in his work on
the law of municipal corporations, 8 states that the distinction is a
creature of the courts conceived by the judges to promote justice to
injured litigants. This then was its raison d' etre. The decline of the
theory that the King can do no wrong, and the advent of the complex
municipal organizations of today with their many instrumentalities
capable of much good and of much harm, assisted in its development.
The creation of this distinction being a means of grounding municipal
liability, and since subsequently it has been applied most frequently
in tort cases, it was quite natural that its technical basis should be
overshadowed by the much more vital and interesting problem
whether or not the injured plaintiff should be allowed a recovery in
the case before the court. As a consequence the courts have often
forgotten that whether a given function was governmental or muni-
cipal depended on whether the state as a whole had a primary duty
and interest in its performance, or whether it was one of the many
conveniences especially accorded to a city's inhabitants. Because of
the failure of the application of the distinction in practice, recent
writers have advocated its abolition as the determining factor in
municipal tort liability.9 A brief study of the cases may shed some
light on the reasonableness of such a contention.
In dealing with the classification of a few of the functions the
courts are in complete accord. Modern states have assumed the obli-
gation of the education of their people. What was formerly a privi-
lege in our day has become a right. Therefore it is the rule that the
construction and maintenance of schools and all activities incident
'i DILLON, op. cit. § iog. See also Hart v. Bridgeport, 13 Blatchf. 289
(C. C. Conn. 1876) ; Hourigan v. Norwich, 77 Conn. 358, 59 At. 487 (1904) ;
Maxmillian v. New York, 62 N. Y. i6o (1875); Wagner v. Portland, 40 Ore.
389, 6o Pac. 985 (1900).
'Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 ILL. L. Q. 28 (1922).
'2 T. R. 667, ioo Eng. Repr. 359 (1798).
7 Moodalay v. E. India Co., I Bro. C. C. 469 (1785). One of the earliest
American cases recognizing the distinction is Riddle v. Proprietors, etc., 7 Mass.
169, 187 (18io).
aI DILLON, op. cit. §110.
*See Wanamaker, J., in Fowler v. Cleveland, ioo Ohio 158, 126 N. E. 72
(1919); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 IL. L. Q. 28
(1922) ; Doddridge, The Distinction Between Governmental and Proprietary
Functions of Municipal Corporations, 23 MIcH. L. REV. 325 (1925); 34 HAIy.
L. REV. 66, Note (1921); 14 CAL. L. REv. 229 (1916).
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thereto, are functions of government, and when these are assumed
by municipal corporations, they partake of the general governmental
immunity from liability for tort.'0 When a city takes over the busi-
ness of a public utility for this purpose it becomes a private corpora-
tion, since it is not a duty of government to furnish water, gas, elec-
tricity, or heat. These functions are therefore held to be municipal.:"
But in dealing with the many other functions of municipalities, there
has been more or less discord.
According to the great majority of courts, the exercise of the
police power is a governmental function."' It is the duty of the state
to protect life, liberty and property in the state, wherever situate.
Police officers in the exercise of their official duties are not the ser-
vants of the city but servants of the state fulfilling a governmental
duty."' A few cases seem opposed to the logical and well established
rule of authority. In Twist v. Rochester 14 the court decided that
the maintenance of a police wire was not a governmental function,
because the wire had been installed by a private corporation and not by
the police. This reason appears unsound, and in a later case ' 5 the
same court held that the prior decision was based on the duty of the
city as to the safety of its streets, even though the danger was caused
by its police employees. And in Jones v. Sioux City 16 it was held
that driving policemen to their beats was a municipal function. But
it appears that in this case the driver of the vehicle causing the injury
was not a police employee, and besides the failure of the city to repair
the street where the accident happened was also an important factor.
Here are cases of admittedly governmental functions, held to be. mu-
nicipal because of the presence of exceptional factors.
Courts are also in substantial accord that the operation of a de-
partment of health by a municipal corporation is in exercise of a
governmental function. It is a duty assumed by all modern nations
to safeguard the health of its citizens. The maintenance of hospi-
1° Kinnare y. Chicago, II II1. 332, 49 N. E. 536 (1898); Hill v. Boston, 122
Mass. 344 (1877); Daniels v. Grand Rapids, 191 Mich. 339, 158 N. W. 23
(1916) ; Folk v. Milwaukee, io8 Wis. 359, 84 N. W. 420 (Igoo). The peculiar
Pennsylvania law as to liability in connection with maintenance of school build-
ings is discussed in 25 L. R. A. (N. s.) 94 (191o).
' Hourigan v. Norwich. 77 Conn. 358, 59 Atl. 487 (904); City of Rich-
mond v. Lincoln, 167 Ind. 468, 79 N. E. 445 (19o6); Esberg v. Portland, 34
Ore. 282, 55 Pac. 961 (1899); Western, etc. v. Phila., 31 Pa. 175 (1858);
Armstrong v. Phila., 249 Pa. 39, 94 Atl. 455 (I915).
" Kistner v. Indianapolis, Ioo Ind. 210 (1884); Hull v. Roxboro, i42 N. C.
455, 55 S. E. 351 (I9o6).
Perkins v. New Haven, 53 Conn. 224 (1885) ; Culver v. Streator, 130 Ill.
238, 22 N. E. 8io (1889); Woodhull v. New York, i5o N. Y. 450, 44 N. E.
io38 (1896) ; Elliott v. Phila., 75 Pa. 347 (1874); 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 537
(1908).
"37 App. Div. 307, 55 N. Y. Supp. 85o (1899).
Cain v. Rochester, 45 App. Div 450, 453, 6o N. Y. Supp. 769, 771 (1899).
185 Iowa 117, 17o N. W. 445 (1919).
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tals,17 the enforcement of health rules,18 and the suppression of con-
tagious diseases '1 are activities in which the state has a primary in-
terest and are governmental functions. 20 But in Kellar v. Los
Angeles 21 it was held that the maintenance of a municipal summer
camp for the children of the slums was a governmental function.
The decision seems based on the ground that this was a public health
measure. The case illustrates the tendency to neglect a strict applica-
tion of the test of the distinction in special cases. The maintenance
of the camp was of peculiar benefit to the city. Its institution was
due to conditions resultant of the amassed population. Of course,
the health of the state was to some extent affected, but only indirectly,
and in a minute degree.
In classifying the operations of fire departments the courts are
in basic disagreement. The great weight of authority is that the pro-
tection of property from fire is a governmental function." . An in-
vestigation of the reasons upon which these decisions are based is
illuminating. The cases of Brinkmeyer v. Evansville and Wilcox v.
Chicago 23 rest upon the ground of "public policy," and on the
ground that liability for negligence of fire departments would render
the city an insurer-neither of which is the test of a governmental
function. The bases for the other decisions cited may be summed up
in the following: "The exemption from liability in these and like
cases is upon the ground that the service is performed by the corpora-
tion in obedience to an act of the legislature; is one in which the cor-
poration, as such, has no particular interest, and from which it de-
rives no special benefit in its corporate capacity; that the members
of the fire department, although employed by the city corporation,
are not the agents and servants of the city, for whose conduct it is
liable. . " It is submitted that none of these reasons is
Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa 495 (1872) ; Benton v. City Hospital, 140 Mass.
13, I N. E. 836 (1885); Murtaugh v. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479 (1869). In City of
Cincinnati v. Cameron, 33 Ohio 336 (1878), is a dictum to the effect that while
the maintenance of hospitals is a governmental function, their construction is
municipal.
'Wyatt v. Rome, iO5 Ga. 312, 31 S. E. 188 (1898).
"Evans v. Kankakee, 231 Ill. 223, 83 N. E. 223 (1907); Nicholson v.
Detroit, 129 Mich. 246, 88 N. W. 695 (19o2); Howard v. Phila., 25o Pa. 184,
95 At. 388 (igi5).
" For a collection of cases see 6 L. R. A. DIG., MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
298 et seq. (i888-1918). Closely allied to the operations of the health depart-
ment are those in which the city is engaged in the care of the poor. This is
considered a governmental function. Maxmillian v. New York, 62 N. Y. 16o
(1875).
"179 Cal. 6o5, 178 Pac. 505 (i919), annotated in 7 CAL. L. REV. 193 (1919).
Jewett v. New Haven, 38 Conn. 368 (3871) ; Wilcox v. Chicago, 1O7 Ill.
334 (1883) ; Brinkmeyer v. Evansville, 29 Ind. 187 (3867) ; Aldrich v. Youngs-
town, io6 Ohio 342, 14o N. E. 164 (1922); Hayes v. Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314
(1873).
' Supra note 22.
='.4 DILLON, Op. Cit. 2895.
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controlling. The test is not whether the function is enjoined
upon the municipality by the legislature, but whether, in its exer-
cise, the welfare of the state as a whole or of the city is primarily
involved. To say that the city has no particular interest in fire pro-
tection, and that firemen are agents of the state, are both instances
of a petitio principii. Another theory advanced is that, "Fire protec-
tion is governmental largely because it protects the property interests,
not only of the inhabitants of the city, but of owners everywhere
who have property in the city." 23 Under this reasoning it could be
held that the maintenance of a municipal water-works was a govern-
mental function because some of the water was used by other than
residents of the city.
The authorities supporting the view that fire protection is a
municipal function are not so numerous . 2  Here also is evidenced
the proneness of courts to abandon the test of the distinction and to
declare liability on other grounds. In Mulcairns v. Janesville and
Wagner v. Portland,2 7 the decisions were based on the ground that the
injury although caused in the conduct of the fire department was due
to the negligence of employees of the city who were not firemen.
This, it is submitted, was simply a convenient means of holding the
municipalities liable. In Bowden v. Kansas City Is the court held that
the maintenance of a fire station was a municipal function, although
recognizing the general duties of fire protection as governmental.
In none of these cases was the test applied. In an able dissenting
opinion in Jewett v. New Haven, Chief Justice Buller says, ". . .
there is no mode by which to determine whether a power or duty is
governmental or not, except to inquire whether it is in its nature such
as well-ordered governments exercise generally for the good of all,
and one whose exercise all citizens have a right to require directly
or by municipal agency, and whether it has ever been assumed or
imposed as such by the government of this state, and would have
been exercised by the state if it had not been by the city. Tested by
these criteria the extinguishment of fires is not a public, governmental
duty." 29 And in Fowler v. Cleveland,30 in dealing with the same
question, Johnson, J., states, ". . . the activities and undertakings
of a municipal corporation are manifold. . . . It seems to be utterly
unreasonable that all these activities and enterprises which are brought
"7 CAL. L. REV. 196 (igi). And see Jewett v. New Haven, stepra note22.
'Bowden v. Kansas City, 69 Kan. 587, 77 Pac. 573 (1904); Fowler v.
Cleveland, Ioo Ohio 158, 126 N. E. 72 (igrg), overruled by Aldrich v. Youngs-
town, io6 Ohio 342, 14o N. E. 164 (1922), and noted in 5 CORN. L. Q. 9o
(1920) and 29 YALE L. T. 911 (1920); Wagner v. Portland, 4o Ore. 389, 6o
Pac. 985 (19o2); Walters -. Carthage, 36 S. Dak. II, 153 N. W. 881 (1915);
Mulcairns v. Janesville, 67 Wis. 24, 29 N. W. 565 (1886).
'¢ Supra note 26.
,Supra note 26.
Supra note 22, at 389. Italics mine.
'Supra note 26, at 163.
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closely home to the lives of all of the people of the municipality must
still be regarded as bound up in the vague and uncertain sphere of
what is called a governmental function."
It is submitted that fire protection as exercised by muncipalities
should be considered a municipal function. Unlike the protection of
public health, this duty has never been assumed by the state for the
welfare of the people at large. It is of interest primarily to the in-
habitants of cities and towns, and, according to the test which we
have seen determines the distinction, it is a municipal function. It
would, therefore, appear incorrect to premise municipal exemption
from liability for torts of their fire departments on the ground that
the latter are engaged in a governmental function.
The application by the courts of the distinction under discussion
to the maintenance of streets by municipalities raises interesting prob-
lems. By the weight of authority the construction and maintenance
of streets is a municipal function.31 Some of the states follow the
view that maintenance of streets is not a municipal but a govern-
mental function.32 Although liability for a dereliction of this duty
is, and may be, placed on many grounds,33 it seems that it should not
be placed on the ground that such activitiy is a municipal function. A
noted commentator on the subject says, "This rule is said to be
founded upon an 'illogical exception' to the general rule of the com-
mon law prohibiting actions for negligence in the discharge of duties
imposed upon them for the sole benefit of the public and from which
they derive no compensation or benefit in their corporate capacity." 3'
The maintenance of highways has always been a duty and function
of the state. It is a duty owed to all its citizens. Sweets are but
continuations of public highways, in spite of the fact that they have
peculiar characteristics of their own. But, on the other hand, there
are streets in cities which are almost exclusively used by their resi-
dents. If the distinction were to be strictly applied, we would be
forced to say that the maintenance of some streets was a governmental
function, and of others a municipal function. It is, perhaps, for these
reasons, that this liability has been placed on other grounds. Here,
'Barnes v. Dist. of Col., 9i U. S. 540 (1875) ; McMahon v. Dubuque, io7
Iowa 62, 77 N. W. 517 (1898); Barree v. Cape Girardeau, 197 Mo. 382, 95
S. W. 330 (i9o6) ; Missano v. New York, x6o N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 574 (3899) ;
Short v. Carbondale, 249 Pa. 564, 95 Atl. 254 (915) ; Hewitt v. Seattle, 62
Wash. 37, 113 Pac. IO84 (igII).
' City of Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139, 4 S. W. 450 (1886);
Sievers v. San Francisco, II5 Cal. 648, 47 Pac. 687 (1897) ; Colwell v. Water-
bury, 74 Conn. 568, 5i Atl. 530 (i9o2) ; Alberts v. Muskegon, 146 Mich. 2io,
io9 N. W. 262 (igo6); Humphrey v. Portland, 79 Ore. 430, 154 Pac. 897
(1916) ; Bates v. Rutland, 62 Vt. 178, 2o At. 278 (i89o) ; Morrison v. Eau
Claire, 115 Wis. 538, 92 N. W. 28o (i9o2).
"See 4 DILLON, op. cit. § 1713 et seq.; 6 MCQUIL.IN, op. Cit. § 2720; 2 SH.
AND R., NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1913) §289.
" 6 McQuILLIN, op. Cit. 5590.
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then, is another situation where the distinction has not been, or is
incapable of being, logically applied.35
The functions of the street-cleaning department have caused the
courts some little difficulty. Here again we find the decisions irrecon-
cilably conflicting. One class of cases holds that in cleaning the
streets, and in the removal of vegetable and mineral refuse, the munic-
ipal body is exercising a governmental power.86 The other cases
maintain that such a function is directly for the benefit of the city's
residents, in which the state, if at all, has only an indirect interest.
37
The former rest almost entirely on the ground that removing ashes
and garbage, and cleaning streets, are health measures and are there-
fore governmental. The latter cases while admitting that such func-
tions pertain in same measure to health regulation, contend that such
is but a secondary consideration. In the very able opinion by Hook,
J., in City of Denver v. Porter,3s is the following: "But in almost all
affairs of purely local concern some indirect relation may be traced
to a matter of health, safety, or other subject of governmental cog-
nizance. The test is not that of casual or incidental connection. If
the duty in question is substantially one of a local or corporate nature,
the city cannot escape responsibility for its careful performance be-
cause it may in some general way also relate to a function of govern-
ment." Furthermore, the collection of garbage, etc., even as a health
measure has never been adopted as a function of the general govern-
ment. If a state does not owe a certain duty to the public, it is not
clear how a municipality can be its agent exercising the delegated
powers of the sovereign in its performance.39
3In cases arising from injuries caused by defective sidewalks, etc., the
courts have treated sidewalks simply as part of the streets. It is surprising, in
a subject where there is such variety of opinion, that there has been no attempt
to distinguish maintenance of sidewalks from maintenance of streets. The for-
mer could well be held to be municipal. Governmental: Humphrey v. Portland,
79 Ore. 430, 154 Pac. 897 (1916); Morrison v. Eau Claire, 115 Wis. 538, 92
N. W. 28o (1902); 2 SH. AND R.,NkLIGFNCE (6th Ed. 1913) §353. Munkipal:
City of Chicago v. Keefe, 1I4 Ill. 222, 2 N. E. 267 (1885) ; Gillard v. Chester,
212 Pa. 338, 6I At. 929 (19o5).
' Harris v. Dist. of Col., 256 U. S. 65o (1921), Holmes, Brandeis, and
Clarke, JJ., dissenting; Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129, 22 S. E. 29 (1894); City
of Louisville v. Carter, i42 Ky. 443, 134 S. W. 468 (1911); Moulton v. Fargo,
39 N. Dak. 5o2, 167 N. W. 717 (i918); Scibilia v. Phila., 279 Pa. 549, 124 AtI.
273 (1924), noted in 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 452 (1924); Connelly v. Nashville,
ioo Tenn. 262, 46 S. W. 565 (I897).
' City of Denver v. Porter, 126 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 8th, 1o93) ; City of Pass
Christian v. Fernandez, ioo Miss. 76, 56 So. 329 (1911) ; Young v. Kansas City,
126 Mo. App. I, 103 S. W. 557 (I9O7); Quill v. New York, 36 App. Div. 476,
55 N. Y. Supp. 889 (1899). Additional cases are collected in 14 A. L. R. 1473
(1921).
"'Supra note 37, at 293.
" The operation of a sewer system is, by the great weight of authority, a
municipal function, but Kentucky holds it to be governmental on the ground that
it is a health measure. Johnson's Adm'rs v. Louisville, 16o Ky. 356, 16g S. W.
827 (914).
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When a city, in an attempt to satisfy the aesthetic and recrea-
tional needs of its people, establishes public parks, it would seem
that there should be no question but that such an activity is for its
own immediate benefit as distinguished from any direct benefit to the
state as a whole. The majority of courts so hold.40  But in a few
states, the maintenance of a public park is deemed a function of the
government, on the convenient ground that this is a public health
measure.4 1 But this is not such a health measure as has been adopted
by the state, which recognizes no duty to maintain parks. Whether
or not a city shall have a park rests solely with the municipality, for
the state is unconcerned. As has been already said, there are few if
any interests which do not in some way partake of a governmental
nature. If such incidental connection is to be made the test, almost
every act of a municipality would be immune.
Thus, except in dealing with a few of the functions, the courts
are in disagreement. Some are influenced by charitable considera-
tions for the plaintiff; some by charitable considerations for the city.
To the former may be attributed the rule that the maintenance of
streets is a municipal function, while the latter tendency is probably
responsible for the view that fire protection is governmental. In this
brief review of the cases we have covered only the functions giving
rise to the greatest number of decisions. Greater confusion is mani-
fest in cases where the functions are carried on simultaneously or con-
currently, as where a municipal waterworks supplies water for fire
protection,4 2 or where a city maintains a building in which are jointly
housed its police and sewer departments, and part of which may also
be leased to private individuals.4 3 Such cases are governed by no rule
at all, the courts working out their own salvation.
History is of little aid in the problem. When Rome was at its
zenith, police protection as well as fire protection was a municipal,
not a governmental, function.44 But police protection is now a gov-
ernmental function. Education formerly was not a duty of govern-
ment, nor was the care of public health. Yet today, courts are in
agreement that these are governmental in nature. It was not until
the nineteenth century that the various states of the United States
"* City of Denver v. Spencer, 34 Colo. 270, 82 Pac. 590 (i9o5) ; Kuenzel v.
St. Louis, 278 Mo. 277, 212 S. W. 876 (3919) ; Gartland v. N. Y. Zoo. Soc., 135
App. Div. I63,-I7I, 12o N. Y. Supp. 24, 30 (19o9) ; Weber v. Harrisburg, 216
Pa. 117, 64 At. 905 (o6).
" Hibbard v. Wichita, 98 Kan. 498, 159 Pac. 399 (1916); Caughlan v.
Omaha, lO3 Neb. 726, 174 N. W. 22o (1919) ; City of Nashville v. Burns, 131
Tenn. 281, 174 S. W. iii (1914) ; Nelson v. Spokane, IO4 Wash. 219, 176 Pac.
149 (1918); Nemet v. Kenosha, 169 Wis. 379, 372 N. W. 711 (919).
. Howland v. Asheville, 174 N. C. 749, 94 S. E. 524 (1917); Piper v.
Madison, 140 Wis. 311, 122 N. W. 73o (igog).
42 See 6 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. §2627.
"For the early history of municipalities, see MuNRO, MUNICIPAL GovERN-
MENT AND ADmINISTRATI N (1923) chap. I.
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began generally to use municipal corporations as agencies of the state
in the performance of state duties.45 As time passes, what was once
a civic convenience becomes a state duty. The tendency is for the
functions to become governmental.
As general conclusions from the foregoing, it seems that there
is some ground for the advocation of the abolition of the distinction.
The test between governmental and municipal functions has not satis-
factorily met the problem of tort liability. It is admitted that a strict
application of the test might solve the discord in the treatment of fire
protection. But lines are so nicely drawn in the cases of street main-
tenance and waste removal, etc., that even a strict application of the
test does not meet the requirements of justice. Furthermore, the legal
concept of a government incapable of wrong has fast receded before
the onslaughts of modern ideas. We now believe that losses and in-
juries should be spread over society instead of being borne by unfor-
tunate and remediless plaintiffs. Cities, more and more, are assum-
ing the general characteristics of giant public service corporations.
Although the distinction is well established in the law, the tendency
of courts to abandon or misapply it in particular cases seems to show
that it is no longer desirable and that it is disintegrating. But judges
are not prone to abandon the well-worn paths of stare decisis. Per-
haps a quicker remedy may come by statute.
G. de F.
'5 Cooley, J., in People v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228, 239 (1873); Eaton, The
Origin of Municipal Incorporation in England and in the United States, 25
A. B. A. RE. 292 (1902).
